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Rather they are justified by their being made correctly in reference 
to necessarily nebulous "fundamental values." 
To Tribe's credit, there is no flinching. In Constitutional 
Choices he writes that "I find all legitimating theories not simply 
amusing in their pretensions but, in the end, as dangerous as they 
are unconvincing. "9 Since a Constitution is, at the simplest level, a 
set of legitimating procedures embodying a legitimating theory, it 
becomes clear that Professor Tribe's quarrel is not really with inter-
pretivists, and not even with the Constitution of the United States, 
but with the basic ideas of constitutionalism and majority rule. 
What does one make of a distinguished constitutional lawyer 
who doubts the possibility of constitutionalism, and whose core 
commitment seems to be to a radical subjectivism? Professor Tribe 
protests that his position does not amount to "a policy of 'anything 
goes' ", but he never succeeds in explaining why it does not-in-
deed, he makes little effort to do so. 
One hopes that a conscientious Senator, instructed by this 
book and confronted by such a nominee, would vote against 
confirmation. 
CONSERVATIVES IN COURT. By Lee Epstein.t Knox-
ville, Tenn.: University of Tennessee Press. 1985. Pp. xii, 
204. $17.95. 
Alan B. Morrison 2 
I began reading this book with some apprehensions. The 
works listed on the back cover as "of related interest" suggested a 
substantial possibility of a conservative bias, at least on the pub-
lisher's part, and the title page indicated that the book was funded 
in part by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, which is known to 
be supportive of conservative organizations. I was concerned that 
the book would be a paean to the conservative movement and that it 
would fail to take a hard look at what was occurring in these orga-
nizations. I was nonetheless hopeful that it would provide substan-
tial new data about these organizations-how they operate, what 
they are doing, how they are financed, and how their success can be 
measured by some objective standard. 
9. L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 6 (1985). 
I. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Southern Methodist University. 
2. Mr. Morrison is the Director of the Public Citizen Litigation Group in Washington, 
D.C., which Ms. Epstein refers to as a "liberal" organization. 
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Unfortunately, the author achieved none of these goals. Un-
like many other political scientists, Professor Epstein is unsophisti-
cated about litigation. As a result, her book is marred by many 
semantic, factual,3 and analytical errors that no experienced ob-
server would make, plus dozens of unhelpful truisms. For example, 
she sometimes displays no awareness that the merits of a contro-
versy may be decisive, implausibly attributing conservative defeats 
to "better organized" opponents of segregation, or seeming unsure 
why "expert attorneys" were unable to persuade the Court that the 
nineteenth amendment was improperly adopted. With similar 
naivete, she mentions a suit by the Washington Legal Foundation 
on behalf of the secret service agent who was shot, along with Presi-
dent Reagan, by John Hinkley. I confess that I have never heard of 
this case, although Epstein reports that it has generated consider-
able publicity. To her, this apparently routine tort suit is a "highly 
salient case" that enhanced the reputation of the plaintiff's attor-
ney. One wonders why. 
Professor Epstein frequently notes that one organization pre-
fers to file amicus briefs, while another prefers to "sponsor" litiga-
tion and still others have recently attempted the tactic of 
intervention. But she does not explain the legal and practical sig-
nificances of these differing approaches. She also fails to supply 
data about the frequency with which each organization employs 
each of these forms of participation in litigation. 
In general, Epstein's data about conservative groups' litigation 
is both sketchy and-at times-misleading. For example, when dis-
cussing the National Right to Work Committee she first observes 
that the Committee has 250 active cases, which sounds like a lot, 
but on the next page she reports that there are fourteen staff attor-
neys plus 100 cooperating outside lawyers, suggesting a rather dif-
ferent picture. Since Epstein does not supply the necessary financial 
data, the reader cannot calculate even approximately how many 
cases or amicus briefs are produced for a given sum. 
The little data she supplies suggests to me that conservative 
groups commit vast resources to filing amicus briefs in the Supreme 
Court-a phenomenon that cries out for appraisal. Yet Epstein 
3. For instance, there was no tax code change in 1939 that caused the spinoff from the 
NAACP of its Legal Defense Fund (p. 5); it is not the Federal Register, but the Federal 
Reporter that attorneys read to find cases (p. 60); Charles Halpern was not "former clerk at 
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals" (p. 119), but a law clerk to a judge on the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; and while the NAACP's suit 
against the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund over the Fund's continued use of 
"NAACP" was successful in 1983 as the book asserts (p. 157, n.l), it was on appeal and 
eventually was reversed. NAACP v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 753 F.2d 131 
(D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3489 (1985). 
452 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 3:450 
makes no effort to determine whether such briefs are more than 
simply echoes of what others are already submitting. Finally, she 
seems to suggest that the choice between a role as a "sponsor" for a 
party and an amicus is simply made according to the individual 
preferences of the group. In fact, financial concerns or the fact that 
you are supporting the government often dictate that you can only 
be an amicus. 
Epstein suggests that amicus briefs may not be very effective, a 
view that I share with many others. The book, however, does not 
test this hypothesis. Perhaps no meaningful study could be done, 
but a survey of judges and their clerks might produce interesting 
anecdotal information about the utility of amicus briefs and might 
reveal the circumstances in which they are not simply disregarded. 
Insofar as Professor Epstein examines the efficacy of amicus 
briefs, she does so in a naive manner. In discussing a case in which 
the Pacific Legal Foundation filed such a brief, she says that "the 
U.S. Supreme Court adopted the PLF's arguments," implying that 
only the PLF had made the point. Since the party being supported 
in that case was the Secretary of Defense, who was represented by 
the Office of the Solicitor General, which is universally recognized 
as having a very able group of attorneys, and since the point re-
ferred to--the need to balance national security concerns against 
the environmental issues-is hardly subtle, it strains credulity to 
think that but for the PLF's brief, the Justices would have had to 
discern that point on their own. If that is the author's view, at least 
she should have made clear that an examination of the govern-
ment's brief revealed no such argument and that therefore a reason-
able inference is that it was the PLF which persuaded the Court to 
adopt the approach.4 
Professor Epstein asserts that one of the "most common traits 
of conservative groups has been their tendency to refrain from co-
operation in litigation," by which she means that "the conservative 
groups have avoided what they consider 'me-too' participation, with 
the intention of eliminating needless duplication of effort," contrary 
to what she believes are the wasteful practices of liberal groups. 
Part of the problem in making these comparisons is that the discus-
sion of liberal groups is based entirely on the research of others, 
most of which appears to have focused on the period before 1969, 
the time when the public interest movement greatly expanded in 
4. Similar overstatements can be found on page 61 regarding the value of an amicus 
brief filed by the National Chamber Litigation Center ("the Supreme Court adopted its argu-
ment in full''), and on page 87 concerning a brief filed by citizens for Decency Through Law 
(whose amicus "arguments were incorporated into the Court's opinion"). 
1986] BOOK REVIEW 453 
scope, size, and subject matter. Perhaps Epstein's conclusions are 
correct, although my own experience is quite to the contrary, as I 
have seen several cases in which "me too" briefs have been filed by 
conservative legal foundations, not only where other similar groups 
were involved, but where their interests were represented by such 
"underrepresented organizations" as the United States Govern-
ment, Duke Power Company, and the Pacific Gas & Electric Com-
pany. I recognize, however, that my experiences are not necessarily 
typical, nor have they been statistically validated. But then I did 
not make so bold an assertion, for if I had, I would surely have 
backed it up by detailed charts and tables, which could be readily 
assembled from the public dockets.s 
Professor Epstein relied too much on secondary sources and on 
the views of the attorneys in the groups that she was studying, with-
out any apparent effort to interview their adversaries. Who, for in-
stance, would take the word of Dan Burt, founder of the Capitol 
Legal Foundation, on anything about the so-called "Nader net-
work," which he has roundly criticized in his own book? Why 
would anyone rely on the views of Raymond Momboisse of the Pa-
cific Legal Foundation, to justify his decision to side with the State 
of California against "liberal" public interest law firm challenges to 
its authority? Momboisse concluded that "the opposition had the 
ability to throw tremendous manpower into the litigation." While 
those of us who have litigated on the liberal side may or may not be 
skilled attorneys, no one else has ever accused us of having "tre-
mendous manpower," and it is difficult to understand why the au-
thor credited such a statement without further inquiry.6 
Ideally, this book would have told us something about the fi-
nances of conservative legal organizations, a topic that could have 
been made even more interesting if coupled with a comparative 
analysis of liberal legal groups. Here again, however, Epstein does 
not dig very deep. In several places she simply relies on what 
people have told her, without even examining the Form 990's that 
every organization is required to file with the IRS annually and that 
5. The chart on page 77, purporting to show success rates of the economic litigation 
groups in the Supreme Court, vastly overstates their importance since a "win" is counted 
whenever a group files a brief on the winning side. The more relevant questions are, who was 
the group supporting, who else was on that side as an amicus, and did the group add anything 
of substance? Numbers like those on page 77 don't begin to scratch the surface of such an 
inquiry. 
6. Ms. Epstein does report that the AFL-CIO claims that the National Right to Work 
Legal Defense Foundation "has not accomplished a great deal and has simply relitigated 
well-settled issues." But even that statement is subject to serious doubt since it comes from a 
1973 secondary source, which was written several years before the Foundation's success in 
the Abood line of cases that the author herself discusses on pages 49-53. 
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are publicly available, except for one schedule listing the names of 
large donors. Professor Epstein does not appear to have asked the 
groups themselves for detailed financial data, and even with respect 
to fundraising, she has not made any real effort to distinguish the 
gross amounts raised through the efforts of Richard Viguerie and 
others from the net available to the organizations, except to note 
that several of the groups broke off their relationships with Viguerie 
because he was taking too large a cut for himself. 
Similarly, there is no hard data on salaries, with a few minor 
exceptions. Indeed, even though James Watt's prior salary at the 
Mountain States Legal Foundation was made public when he joined 
the Reagan Cabinet (he took a slight pay cut), that figure does not 
appear. Given the ability of magazines such as The American Law-
yer to probe deep into the books of America's largest and most se-
cretive law firms, it seems likely that any real effort by an interested 
researcher, particularly one with conservative credentials, would 
have produced some real information about salary levels. For a 
scholar who wants to do a comparative study of the differences in 
conservative and liberal organizations, salaries should be one of the 
first items on the research agenda. 1 
Another important question is whether the new conservative 
groups are, like their older counterparts, little more than covers for 
the economic interests on whose side they so often appear, as exem-
plified by the test case for the child labor laws that Professor 
Epstein discusses. Symptomatic of this problem is that the author 
wrote two separate chapters, titled, respectively, Conservative Eco-
nomic Litigation Since the 1960s and Conservative Public Interest 
Litigation Since the 1970s, with little more than a hint that there is 
any basis for the charge that there is substantial overlap between 
these groups. That question needs to be answered, but it can be 
done only by looking very specifically at particular cases and not by 
posing general questions of the participants, asking them to describe 
the kinds of litigation their group is doing. Once again, my own 
experience tells me that the charge that these groups are little more 
than covers for big business has substantial merit, although I recog-
nize that in some cases there are philosophical principles at stake in 
which it is not simply big business running under a protective public 
interest cover. Indeed, Professor Oliver Houck's massive study of 
7. One example of the relative financial resources of the conservative law firms is that 
in a case in which my group was suing the Federal Government over its refusal to rehire the 
fired air controllers, Mountain States Legal Foundation moved to intervene (along with an-
other conservative D.C. group with its own counsel), and flew three lawyers from Denver to 
Washington just for that quite routine motion. 
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this question, With Charity For Al/,s does the very kind of analysis 
not done here from the perspective of the IRS's guidelines on public 
interest law firms and concludes that these conservative groups 
don't pass the test. And in the area in which the possibility of this 
deception is perhaps the greatest-the Right to Work Committee's 
efforts to foster its vision of union democracy-there is almost no 
attention paid to the very serious issue of whether the vast majority 
of the Committee's support for dissident union members comes 
from those who would prefer to see no unions at all. 
Perhaps the most interesting comment in the book is Epstein's 
casual observation that "unlike liberals, conservatives are divided 
over the very use of the courts. Many are reluctant to advocate 
judicial activism, regardless of ideological bent." That is a very in-
teresting observation, but one which is left dangling with almost no 
discussion or analysis. What does the term "conservative" mean in 
the context of judicial activism? Is it a political label or a vision of 
the role of the courts? Are conservatives, as the quotation seems to 
suggest, acting inconsistently because they believe that the courts 
should be used for their purposes, but not for those of others with 
whom they disagree, or is there an underlying philosophical basis 
under which it is truly conservative to use the courts, at least in 
some circumstances? Do the answers differ depending on which 
side the conservative or liberal is supporting (the individual, a busi-
ness, or the government), and does that difference, if any, run 
through the whole gamut of litigation or does it just exist in certain 
areas? Put in soap opera terms, the question, "Can a true conserva-
tive find true love in juducial activism?" is one that should have 
been asked, but apparently did not occur to the author. 
In earlier eras, the typical suit against government was brought 
on behalf of a business, and advanced "conservative" legal argu-
ments. Yet over the last few decades the charge of "judicial activ-
ism" has been made principally by conservatives who object to 
others going to court to overturn executive or legislative decisions. 
Yet history shows that at one time these conservatives were either 
activists themselves or had that role carried on for them by their 
doctrinal forerunners. Even today a very substantial portion of the 
challenges to government decisions are brought by businesses and 
not by consumers, environmentalists, or civil libertarians. The 
point is hinted at in Epstein's book, but she never states the proposi-
tion, let alone fully develops it. 
There is a related irony in Professor Epstein's discussion of the 
8. Houck, With Charity For All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415 (1984). The article includes a 
breakdown between amicus and party representation. 
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suits brought by those who were opposed to federal welfare in the 
1920's, which led to the Supreme Court's decisions in Massachusetts 
v. Mellon and Frothingham v. Mellon, holding, respectively, that 
neither states nor individual taxpayers have standing to challenge 
federal welfare grants. Although the lessons of those cases are 
deeply imbedded in my litigating repertoire, I had not focused for 
many years on the fact that they were brought by conservatives, 
rather than liberals, whereas today many of the challenges to exces-
sive, improper, or unlawful government spending are brought by 
taxpayers advancing liberal arguments. But as is so often the case 
in administrative law, procedural rulings on issues such as standing 
apply to all parties regardless of their political outlooks. In fact, as 
Epstein observes, several of the suits of conservative groups ran 
aground on standing.9 I wish that she had related this fact to the 
more general question of the propriety of conservative legal 
activism. 
Another interesting observation in the book, which the author 
never develops, is that labor and other liberal groups used to file 
charges with bar associations against conservative organizations for 
allegedly improper conduct in stirring up litigation. That tactic has 
now been turned around, as most of the charges go in the opposite 
political direction. Yet the author, as in the standing area, never 
inquires about the utility of such efforts, in either the short or long 
term. 
At the end of the book Epstein has a section entitled Success 
and Future of Conservative Interest Group Litigation. The reader at 
this point expects to find what has been missing all along, a coher-
ent theory about where this movement has come from and where it 
is going, yet the author can only muster thirty-one lines, less than 
three quarters of a page, in which to state her case. And what a 
case it is: "Regardless of the measure used, it is more difficult to 
assess the success of the newer conservative groups; the conserva-
tive public interest law firms, in particular, are just beginning to get 
their feet wet; . . . their ability to achieve such goals depends upon 
their ability to attract adequate funding;" and "judicial politics, in 
fact, may not be significantly different from the legislative and exec-
utive processes, which are widely understood to be characterized by 
9. In this regard it is bad enough for the author not to disclose that the Washington 
Legal Foundation lost both cases involving the challenges to the transfer of the Panama Ca-
nal and the termination of the Taiwan Treaty, but to cite the cases as events that "helped the 
WLF to solidify its reputation within the conservative community in the capital" suggests 
that conservatives are impressed by filing suits, with no concern for the outcome, a view I 
would not attribute to thoughtful strategists of any political stripe. 
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the presence of competing group interests." 10 
What this book could and should have been is a serious exami-
nation of the role played by the various conservative organizations 
currently part of today's legal scene. Are they simply covers for 
business organizations? Do some of them simply echo the positions 
taken by law enforcement officials? Are there groups that truly rep-
resent individuals who otherwise have no representation, the crite-
rion that those of us in the liberal public interest movement believe 
describes the proper role of the public interest lawyer? Who exactly 
are these conservative groups, what are they doing, how effective 
are they, and what would be lost to the system if not another penny 
went to support them? Where do judicial activism and restraint fit 
into long-term conservative strategy? I do not know the answers to 
many of these questions, but I do know that I cannot find them in 
Conservatives in Court. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OPINIONS: ASPECTS OF THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS. By Leonard W. Levy.1 Oxford Univer-
sity Press. 1986. Pp. 272. $29.95. 
Donald 0. Dewey2 
When a historian's second volume of essays is published, you 
know he is both prolific and influential. If that historian is Leonard 
Levy, you also know the essays will be trenchant, controversial, and 
often witty. 
This selection of twelve essays concentrates primarily on first 
and fifth amendment freedoms-especially those concerning speech, 
press and religion and the freedom against compulsory self-incrimi-
nation. Most of the essays come from the 1980's, though one was 
printed as early as 1961 and another in 1962. Two have never 
10. In several places Epstein tries to draw a distinction between conservative groups 
and their liberal counterparts by statements, such as the following, that set up contrasts that 
are meaningless to me: "Its founders believed that the [Pacific Legal Foundation] would 
handle legal issues rather than advocate specific causes arising in California and dealing with 
the environment, in particular" (p. 121). See also (or perhaps compare) at 122-23: the PLF 
"has not attempted to bring test cases to court. Rather, PLF attorneys 'have been involved in 
systematic [litigation] campaigns ... from the other side' ... by putting liberal groups on the 
defensive." (The example cited is an amicus brief supporting the Navy.) See also discussion 
on page 50 contrasting the strategy of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund and 
the Right to Work Legal Defense Fund and the discussions of various strategies on page 132. 
I. Andrew W. Mellon All Claremont Professor of Humanities and Chairman of the 
Graduate Faculty of History at Claremont Graduate School. 
2. Professor of History and Dean of Natural and Social Sciences at California State 
University, Los Angeles. 
